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THE WORLD'S LARGEST WIND ENERGY 
FACILITY IN NANTUCKET SOUND? 
DEFICIENCIES IN THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY PROCESS FOR OFFSHORE 
WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
GUY R. MARTIN* 
ODIN A. SMITH** 
Abstract: Cape Wind Associates' proposal to build the first offshore 
wind facility in Nantucket Sound has exposed a regulatory void 
resulting from the lack of a federal management program designed to 
govern the development of offshore wind energy projects. Though 
there are statutes that govern offshore oil and gas development, 
thermal energy conversion, and deepwater port construction, no such 
law exists for offshore wind energy development. In the face of this lack 
of federal management, Cape Wind seeks to freely use the lands and 
waters of Nantucket Sound with no property right or grant of 
permission other than a simple permit authorizing an impediment to 
navigation under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation 
Act of 1899. No permits for projects like Cape Wind's proposal should 
be issued until a comprehensive program is developed; this program 
should make possible the orderly, expeditious, and environmentally 
sound consideration of offshore wind energy projects with full return to 
the federal government. 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 21, 2001, Cape Wind Associates (Cape Wind), a 
private energy development company, submitted to the New England 
District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) an application 
for a navigability permit under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act of 1899 (section 10 or RHA) to develop a massive 
* Guy R. Martin is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of the law firm of Perkins 
Coie LLP. 
** Odin A. Smith is an associate in the Washington, D.C., office of the law firm of Per-
kins Coie LLP. 
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wind energy plant in Nantucket Sound.1 Located on federal lands and 
waters approximately five miles from Cape Cod, nine miles from Mar-
tha's Vineyard, and thirteen miles from Nantucket, the project that 
Cape Wind proposes would be the first offshore wind energy plan t in 
the United States, and one of the largest offshore wind energy plants 
in the world.2 The most recent proposal calls for the wind plant to 
cover twenty-four square miles of the Sound. The project will consist 
of 130 wind towers and turbines, each over 400 feet tall, connected to 
the mainland by means of an underground cable carrying electricity 
from a transmission station located in the midst ofthe wind plant.3 
It is easy to understand why Cape Wind or another private entre-
preneur would propose such a project. In Massachusetts, large subsi-
dies are available for wind energy. The Commonwealth has adopted a 
renewable portfolio standard, which requires that a minimum per-
cen tage of retail electricity sales in Massachusetts come from renew-
able energy sources starting in 2003.4 The purpose of the standard is 
to create a market for renewable energy that would otherwise be un-
competitive. Massachusetts also imposes a 0.0005 dollar per kilowatt 
hour tax on electricity to support the development and promotion of 
renewable energy projects.5 In addition to the commonwealth's subsi-
dies, federal subsidies include a 1.8 cen t per kilowatt hour tax credit 
and accelerated depreciation on capital investrnents.6 Thus, there ex-
ists the poten tial to make large economic gains from the project. 
The choice of Nantucket Sound as the site is also understandable 
from the perspective of a private developer. The wind resource is good, 
1 See Cape Wind Associates, LLC, Application for Department of the Army Permit, 
New England District, for Section 10 Permit (Nov. 21, 2001) (on file with author), 
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil (last visited Jan. 23, 2004). 
2 See Frederick Melo, Wind Farm Delay Urged, CAPE COD TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, available at 
http://www.capecodonline.com/special/windfarm/delayurged7.htm; see also CAPE WIND, 
ENERGY FOR LIFE, at http://www.capewind.org/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2003) (providing 
general information about Cape Wind Associates (Cape Wind». 
3 See Melo, supra note 2; see also CAPE WIND, supra note 2. 
4 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25A, § llF (2002). 
5 See id. ch. 25, § 20 (2002). 
6 This is a federal tax credit, last extended in Pub. L. No. 107-147, which expired on De-
cember 31, 2003. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 
Stat. 21 (2002). A further extension is found in the omnibus energy bill, which mayor may 
not pass, but it is expected that even if the energy bill does not pass, the tax credit will even-
tually be passed in some other legislative vehicle, with retroactive effect. See generally UNION 
OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, UPDATE ON TAX CREDITS FOR RENEWABLES (2002) (detailing the 
extension of the tax credit for wind energy through December 31, 2003), at http:// 
www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/renewable_energy/ page.cfm?pageID= 121 (last modified Oct. 
29,2002). 
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the water shallow, and the distance to shore and to a power grid is rela-
tively short.7 Most of all, however, the site is federal. 8 All factors opti-
mize private profit. 
In its pursuit of these financial gains, Cape Wind seeks to exploit 
a regulatory void. It is counting on the absence of an established fed-
eral management program designed to govern the development of 
offshore wind energy projects to make it possible to both use and oc-
cupy federal lands and waters without payment of rent or royalties, 
participation in competitive bidding, or acquisition of a property 
right, as well as to achieve a reduced level of federal scrutiny because 
there are no standards to govern offshore wind energy. The loophole 
Cape Wind seeks to exploit is the lack of existing law authorizing the 
use and occupancy of federally controlled offshore lands and waters 
for wind energy projects. While such laws have been enacted for oil 
and gas development under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(OCSLA),9 thermal energy conversion,lO and deepwater port con-
struction,I1 no similar program exists for wind energy plants. Cape 
Wind takes this to mean that the lands and waters of Nantucket 
Sound are freely open to wind energy projects and subject to devel-
opment for private purposes with no property right or grant of per-
mission other than a simple permit authorizing an impedimen t to 
navigation under section 10. 
On the basis of this theory, Cape Wind has already built a 200-foot 
data tower on federal lands and waters in the Sound and is pushing 
forward aggressively with its section 10 application for the entire wind 
energy project.12 Seeing this opportunity presented by the Cape Wind 
model for private offshore wind energy development, other companies 
have rushed to try to secure their own section 10 permits. Within one 
year of Cape Wind's proposal, nearly two dozen sites had been staked 
out from New England to Virginia for large-scale wind energy plants. 13 
7 See generally CAPE WIND, PROJECT OVERVIEW: TABLE OF CONTENTS, at http://www. 
capewind.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2004) (providing general information about the Cape 
Wind project). 
8 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1) (2000). 
943 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (2000). 
10 Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act ofl980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9168 (2000). 
11 Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (2000). 
12 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 288 
F. Supp. 2d 64, 69-70 (D. Mass. 2003), appeal docketed, No. 03-2604 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2003). 
\3 See John Leaning, Winergy Pitches Two More Wind Farms Near Cape, CAPE COD TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2002, http://www.capecodonline.com/speciallwindfarm/winergypitchesI3.htm 
(indicating that a speculator from Winergy has identified another seventeen potential 
plant sites along the East Coast and has indicated that his company's intent is to "corner 
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All of these proposals seek to follow the same regulatory path of least 
resistance defined by the Cape Wind application, involving the minimal 
level of review provided under section 10 and lacking any form of land 
use authorization. As a result, over the last year a veritable land rush 
has arisen to claim, without competitive bidding, sites for huge offshore 
wind energy projects}4 
The Cape Wind proposal has generated extraordinary opposition 
and controversy, distinctly out of proportion to what might be ex-
pected for an alternative energy project favored by public policy}5 In 
summary, it may be a good idea, but it is in the wrong place. Nan-
tucket Sound is a cherished ecological, commercial, and recreational 
resource of regional, national, and international significance. The 
threat posed by the Cape Wind project to all of these values has mobi-
lized a massive opposition effort in which virtually every affected in-
terest has come forward in opposition to either this project or the 
manner in which it is being processed in the absence of an adequate 
regulatory program.16 
As discussed below, there is no question that the current regula-
tory program for offshore wind energy projects is lacking. Section 10 
provides for a navigation permit, but not for regulation of the com-
mercial activity or authorization of private use of federal lands}7 The 
Cape Wind project review stands as an anomaly in federal land and 
natural resource law.ls Nowhere else under federal law can a situation 
be found where private developers are allowed to proceed on an ad 
the best offshore sites for future wind-farm development"); see also CAPE COD TIMES, PRO-
POSED NANTIICKET SOUND WIND FARMS (2004) (posting the most recent developments 
regarding the controversy generated by Cape Wind's project proposed for Nantucket 
Sound), at http://www.capecodonline.com/special/windfarm (last visited Jan. 23, 2004). 
Ii See Leaning, supra note 13; see also CAPE COD TIMES, supra note 13. 
15 See Charles M. Sennott, Denmark's Windmills Flourish as Cape Cod Power Project Stalls, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 22, 2003, at Al (describing the picturesque beauty of wind power 
facilities in Europe, where they are seen as a "proud symbol" of environmental conscious-
ness, and the surprise of Cape Wind executives that a similar project in Nantucket Sound 
has met such vehement opposition). 
16 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 67, 78 (challenging Cape 
Wind's project on the basis of environmental concerns as well as the lack of a regulatory 
framework governing its construction); see also ALLIANCE TO PROTECT NANTIICKET SOUND, 
SAVE OUR SOUND-PROTECTING NANTIICKET SOUND FROM INDUSTRIALIZATION (2004) (de-
tailing the arguments asserted by this group of "dedicated environmental and business 
professionals who have long ties to the Cape" against permitting the construction of the 
wind energy plant in Nantucket Sound), at http://www.saveoursound.org (last visited Jan. 
24,2004). 
17 See 33 U .S.C. § 403 (2000). 
18 See discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
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hoc basis to use and occupy federally controlled land and water with-
out permission, without the benefit of a comprehensive resource-
specific review, and without making payments to the United States.19 
When a resource as valuable as Nantucket Sound is at stake, such a 
haphazard and insufficient process is clearly inadequate. 
Cape Wind argues that the Nantucket Sound wind energy plant 
proposal should be considered under existing law based on the prem-
ise that the public interest review conducted by the Corps to issue 
navigability permits under section 10, combined with the procedures 
of Massachusetts law and the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), are sufficient to ensure a reasoned decision.20 This premise is 
flawed on numerous counts. 
As a threshold matter, the Corps lacks jurisdiction to issue sec-
tion 10 permits in offshore waters.21 Even if it had such authority, a 
section 10 permit does not confer the property rights necessary to use 
and occupy federal lands.22 The area Cape Wind seeks to use for its 
power plant is subject to federal ownership and control and cannot be 
exploited as proposed here without express federal authorization. No 
mechanism exists to grant such approval. The standard approach un-
der federal law for allowing the private use of public resources re-
quires, under the Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 
that Congress expressly authorize the disposition of U.S. property.23 It 
is also standard for compensation to be made to the United States, 
typically through a competitive bidding process.24 No such payment 
structure exists for the Cape Wind project, and the developer seeks to 
use this land for free.25 
19 See discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
20 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 72,77-78. 
21 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
22 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
23 See discussion infra Part I.A 
24 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
25 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (outlining the controversy 
surrounding the Corps's issuance of a section 10 permit to Cape Wind pursuant to 33 
U.S.C. § 403). Other federal legislation, such as the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(OCSLA), establish comprehensive regulatory provisions governing private development 
of federal lands regarding granting property rights, subjecting entities to a competitive 
bidding process, and collecting royalties from private entities that use them. See generally 43 
U.S.C. § 1331-1356. No such regulatory framework exists for wind energy projects, and the 
federal government would collect no revenue from Cape Wind. See Letter from Rebecca 
W. Watson, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land and Minerals Management, to the 
Honorable Richard B. Cheney, President of the Senate 1 (june 20, 2002) (discussing the 
lack of federal regulations regarding the utilization of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 
for non-oil and gas related activities) (on file with author) [hereinafter Watson Letter]. 
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Even if the Corps has jurisdiction and a section 10 permit suffices 
to allow use and occupancy of these lands, the RHA is an inadequate 
mechanism for decision makin g. No standards exist to govern the 
Corps's decisions. Instead, only a laundry list of factors to be taken 
into account is enumerated in a single, one-paragraph regulation.26 
Similar decisions made under other federal statutes require the appli-
cation of specific decision criteria, usu;llly articulated in detail by 
Congress and tailored to the issues associated with the proposed activ-
ity.27 The Corps lacks the expertise to make these judgmen ts in the 
area of energy development and public land use, and it should not be 
allowed to do so in the absence of clearly articulated standards. In ad-
dition, there are numerous defects, beyond the scope of this Article, 
in the environmental review the Corps is actually undertaking for the 
Cape Wind project.28 
The first section of this Article explains in greater detail the rea-
sons why section 10 falls far short of the regulatory approach used in 
every comparable context. The second section of this Article contains 
a proposal for a comprehensive federal program that would protect 
areas like Nantucket Sound while simultaneously promoting alterna-
tive energy. The intense controversy and divisive debate over Cape 
Wind's proposal is proving to be a setback to responsible alternative 
energy development. The Cape Wind project is perhaps the worst 
possible poster child for offshore wind energy development, and the 
baggage it is carrying is detracting from efforts to develop consensus 
on how best to proceed with the review and approval of such projects. 
The proposed program for wind energy would cure the deficiencies 
of the current system and protect Nantucket Sound and similar areas 
while ensuring the expeditious assessment of the potential for wind 
26 See 33 C.F.R. § 325.3(c)(I) (2003) (mandating that the Corps consider "the cumula-
tive effects" of issuing section 10 permits, including "conservation, economics, aesthetics, 
[and] general environmental concerns"). 
27 See discussion and notes infra Part lIlA. 
28 See, e.g., Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 78. In challenging the 
Corps's issuance ofa section 10 permit to Cape Wind, Plaintiffs allege that the Corps 
[d. 
failed to comply with [the National Environmental Policy Act] in the follow-
ing ways: (1) it did not circulate the [environmental assessment] and [finding 
of no significant impact statement] for public comment, (2) it did not ade-
quately consider alternatives to the data tower, (3) it acted improperly in re-
viewing the data tower application apart from the wind energy plant applica-
tion, and (4) it did not consider the environmental effects of removal of the 
data tower. 
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energy development in the marine environment and the best loca-
tions, on balance, for such facilities. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Offshore J1l1isdiction 
In United States v. Maine, the Supreme Court held that the United 
States is possessed of paramount rights in the offshore lands underly-
ing the Atlantic Ocean, from three nautical miles from the coast sea-
ward to the edge of the Outer Continental Shelf (the OCS), and fur-
ther held that this rule is confirmed by both the Submerged Lands 
Act (SLA) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).29 
There is no doubt that "paramount rights," or "the power of disposi-
tion," include ownership.30 In Maine, the Supreme Court expressly 
relied on three seminal cases:31 United States v. California,32 United States 
v. Louisiana,33 and United States v. Texas.34 
In California, the Court held that the federal government has 
"paramount rights in and full dominion and power over" the lands of 
the three-mile marginal sea.35 Here the Court characterized its task as 
determining which sovereign "owns" the three-mile belt, and assumed 
that the Property Clause of the Constitution gave Congress authority 
to protect the federal interest.36 It also suggested that the federal 
rights being recognized went beyond ownership, explaining that: 
"[t]he crucial question on the merits is not merely who owns the bare 
legal title to the lands under the marginal sea. The United States here 
asserts rights in two capacities transcending those of a mere property 
own er. "37 
29 420 U.S. 515, 524-27 (1975) (citing the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) , 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1301, and the OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). 
30 Id. at 526-28. 
31 Id. at 518-19 (looking to the three prior cases and declining to overrule their hold-
ings, stating "California, Louisiana, and Texas rule the issues before us."). 
32 332 U.S. 19, 19 (1947), supplemented /Jy 332 U.S. 804, 805 (1947) (order and decree). 
33339 U.S. 699, 699 (1950), judgment entered /Jy 340 U.S. 899, 899 (1950). 
34 339 U.S. 707,707 (1950), judgment entered /Jy 340 U.S. 900, 900 (1950). 
35 332 U.S. at 38-39. "[Plaramount rights" and "full dominion" encompass "owner-
ship." Id. 
36 See id. at 26-27. 
37 Id. at 29. 
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Any doubt about whether federal rights in offshore-submerged 
lands extended beyond the traditional three mile territorial sea38 dis-
appeared with the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Louisi-
ana39 and Texas.4o Louisiana and Texas both claimed title to submerged 
lands even beyond the three mile territorial sea and the United States 
filed original actions alleging that it is "'the owner in fee simple of, or 
possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, 
the lands, minerals, and other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico, 
lying seaward of the low-water mark'" on the coasts of those states.41 
Again the Court held for the federal government saying that: "[iJf, as 
we held in California's case, the three-mile belt is in the domain of the 
Nation rather than that of the separate States, it follows a fortiori that 
the ocean beyond that limit also is."42 The Court decreed that "[t]he 
United States is now, and has been at all times pertinent hereto, pos-
sessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the 
lands, minerals and other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico" to the 
twenty-seven mile limit of Louisiana's claim,43 and to the edge of the 
continental shelf, as claimed by Texas.44 
In Texas, the State had sought to distinguish itself from the Cali-
fonda precedent by the fact that it had been a sovereign nation prior 
to entering the Union and, as such, had held title to the submerged 
lands within its three league-nine nautical miles-offshore bounda-
ries.45 As such, "prior to annexation Texas had both dominium (owner-
ship or proprietary rights) and imperium (governmental powers of 
regulation and control) as respects the lands, minerals and other 
products underlying the marginal sea. "46 Texas claimed in the litiga-
tion that upon entering the Union it "retained the dominium over the 
marginal sea ... and transferred to the National Government only 
her powers of sovereignty-her i1llpetiulfb--OVer the marginal sea."47 
The Court acknowledged Texas's prior title to the seabed, but denied 
38 The territorial sea has since been extended to 12 nautical miles by President Reagan 
in 1988. Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988). The Proclamation, 
however, specifically declined to "extend[] or otherwise alter[] existing Federal or State 
law or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom.' [d. 
39 Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 705. 
40 Texas, 339 U.S. at 717-20. 
41 Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 701; Texas, 339 U.S. at 709. 
42 Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 705. 
43 United States v. Louisiana, 340 U.S. 899, 899 (1950). 
44 United States v. Texas, 340 U.S. 900, 900-01 (1950). 
45 See Texas, 339 U.S. at 711. 
46 [d. at 707, 712. 
47 [d. at 713. 
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that the State retained that title upon joining the Union, holding that 
when Texas joined the Union it transferred some of its sovereignty to 
the federal government, and "as an incident to the transfer of that 
sovereignty any claim that Texas may have had to the marginal sea was 
relinquished to the United States."48 Mter quoting its decision in Cali-
fornia, the Court went on to say that "although d01ninium and imperium 
are normally separable and separate, this is an instance where property 
interests are so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to follow sover-
eignty."49 The Court further stated that "[p]roperty rights must then 
be so subordinated to political rights as in substance to coalesce and 
unite in the national sovereign .... If the property, whatever it may 
be, lies seaward of low-water mark, its use, disposition, managemen t, 
and con trol involve national in terests and national responsibilities. "50 
In short, "paramount power" includes both sovereignty and title, and 
the United States owns the OCS, in every sense of the word.51 
B. Offshore Legislation 
Congress enacted the OCSLA in 1953 to assert federal jurisdic-
tion over OCS lands and to establish a regulatory framework for the 
extraction of minerals, primarily oil and gas, from those lands.52 The 
OCSLA authorizes the exploration, development, and production of 
minerals from the OCS, and establishes a comprehensive regulatory 
program for granting the property rights to do so through leases and 
collecting royalties.53 
In contrast, the development of non-extractive energy resources 
on the OCS is not contemplated in the OCSLA. Rather, Congress has 
provided for the authorization and regulation of some other specific 
activities of this type in separate legislation.54 There is no legislation 
48 Id. at 718. 
49Id. at 719 (emphasis added). 
50Id. 
51 See Texas, 339 U.S. at 71 9-20. 
52 See 43 U .S.C. § 1332 (2000) (detailing congressional policy regarding federal juris-
diction over the OCS). 
53 See generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356. 
54 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (authorizing regulatory authority regarding "the lo-
cation, ownership, construction, and operation of deepwater ports in waters beyond the 
territorial limits of the United States"); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9168 (outlining regulations 
regarding "the construction, location, ownership, and operation of ocean thermal energy 
conversion facilities connected to the United States by pipeline or cable, or located in 
whole or in part between the high-water mark and the seaward boundary of the territorial 
sea of the United States"). 
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covering offshore wind energy projects. This fact has been noted by the 
agency that administers the OCSLA, the Department of the Interior 
(DOl), which recognized that "mechanisms do not currently exist by 
which an applicant can obtain approval from the Federal Government 
to utilize the OCS for non-oil and gas related activities. "55 In light of 
that fact, the DOl proposed legislation to amend the OCSLA for this 
purpose.56 Ms.Johnnie Burton, Director of the Minerals Management 
Service, reiterated these concerns when she testified before the House 
of Representatives and stated that there exists "no clear authority within 
the federal government to comprehensively review, permit, and provide 
appropriate regulatory oversight of such projects. "57 
II. FEDERAL AUTHORITY FOR OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY FACILITIES 
A. Jurisdiction 
On the most basic level, offshore wind projects should not even 
be entertained under the RHA, as the Corps does not have jurisdic-
tion over the offshore waters for wind energy projects. This issue is 
the subject of ongoing litigation filed by the Alliance to Protect Nan-
tucket Sound (the Alliance), a local grassroots opposition group, chal-
lenging the Corps's issuance of the section 10 permit for the data col-
lection tower that Cape Wind has built on the federal lands and 
waters of Nantucket Sound.58 The initial decision on this issue found 
in favor of the Corps, but an appeal of that decision is imminent.59 
The Corps's stated basis for issuing a permit for the data tower is 
its authority over obstructions to navigation under section 10 of the 
RHA.6o The Corps's jurisdiction under the RHA, however, extends 
only three nautical miles offshore.61 Because the data tower is clearly 
55 Watson Letter, supra note 25, at 1. 
56 [d.; see H.R. 5156, 107th Congo (2002). 
57 Administration Legislation on Energy Related Uses of the DCS: Hearing on H.R. 5156 Before 
the House Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res., Comm. on Res., 107th Congo 4 (2002) (state-
ment of Johnnie Burton, Director, Minerals Mgmt. Serv.), available at http://www.mms. 
gov / ooc/ newweb/ congressionalaffairs/testirnony72502.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2004). 
58 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 288 
F. Supp. 2d 64, 6!Hi7 (D. Mass. 2003). 
59 [d. at 82. 
60 See id. at 70-71. 
61 See 33 C.F.R. §§ 329.12(a), 320.2(b) (2003). Compare 33 C.F.R. § 322.3 (a)(2003) , with 
33 C.F.R. § 322.3(b). Section 10 prohibits unauthorized obstructions to "the navigable 
capacity of any of the waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 403. Congress, in enacting 
the RHA (which replaced the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, and used the same language 
as the 1890 Act), "adopted the judicial definition of those waters as of 1890." United States 
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beyond three miles, the Corps relies on an extension of its RHA juris-
diction to certain activities on the OCS by the OCSLA.62 The OCSLA 
by its express terms, however, does not extend the Corps's jurisdiction 
for activities on the OCS other than to those related to the extraction 
of minerals.63 
In the OCSLA, Congress specifically delineated the extension of 
the Corps's jurisdiction under section 10 of the RHA. The original 
grant of jurisdiction in 1953 was quite broad, extending "[t]he 
authority of the Secretary of the Army to prevent obstruction to navi-
gation in the navigable waters of the United States ... to artificial is-
lands and fixed structures located on the Outer Continental Shelf. "64 
In 1978, however, Congress amended this grant of authority, expressly 
narrowing the scope of the Corps's jurisdiction. As amended, the 
Corps's authority to prevent obstruction of navigation is extended to 
"the artificial islands, installations, and other devices referred to in sub-
section (a) of this section."65 Subsection (a) refers to 
all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices 
permanen tly or temporarily attached to the seabed, which 
may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, develop-
ing, or producing resources therefrom, or any such installation or 
other device (other than a ship or a vessel) for the purpose of 
transporting such resources.66 
"Resources" is not defined in the OCSLA,67 but "exploration," "devel-
opment," and "production" are all defined in terms of "minerals," 
v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 609 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Minnehaha Creek Water-
shed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 1979). As of 1890, the navigable waters 
of the United States extended seaward three nautical miles, the extent of the territorial 
sea, beyond which were the high seas. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 32-33 
n.16 (1947) (summarizing the history of the three-mile territorial sea, and noting that the 
first official American claim to a three-mile territorial sea was made in 1793 and has since 
won general international acceptance). 
62 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73 (citing 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1333(a) (l),(e) (2000»; see also 33 C.F.R. §§ 329.12(a), 322.3(b), 320.2(b) (recognizing 
section 10 jurisdiction as extending beyond the three-mile territorial sea limit on the 
OCS). 
63 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), (e) (2000). 
64 See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(f) (1953). 
65 43 U.S.C. § 1333(e) (2000) (emphasis added). 
66 [d. § 1333(a) (1) (extending federal law to such installations) (emphasis added). 
67 "Natural resources" as defined in the Submerged Lands Act, companion legislation 
to the OCSLA, "includes, without limiting the generality thereof, oil, gas, and all other 
minerals, and fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and other marine 
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which is defined as "includ[ing] oil, gas, sulphur, geopressured-
geothermal and associated resources, and all other minerals which 
are authorized by an Act of Congress to be produced from 'public 
lands' .... "68 The Corps's authority to issue section 10 permits for 
offshore installations is therefore limited to those installations erected 
for the extraction of minerals from the OCS. 
The absence of Corps jurisdiction over non-mineral activities is not 
surprising, given the purpose of the OCSLA. Congress enacted the law 
in 1953 for the purpose of asserting federal jurisdiction over the OCS 
lands and to establish a regulatory framework for the extraction of 
minerals-primarily oil and gas-from those lands.69 The OCSLA 
authorizes the exploration, development, and production of minerals 
from the OCS, and establishes a comprehensive regulatory program for 
granting leases and collecting royalties.70 In contrast, the OCSLA does 
not provide for the development of non-extractive energy resources on 
the OCS. Rather, Congress has provided for the authorization and 
regulation of other specific activities of this type in separate legislation, 
such as the Deepwater Port Act,7J and the Ocean Thermal Energy Con-
version Act of 1980.72 Significantly, Congress has not delegated to the 
Corps section 10 jurisdiction on the OCS for these uses. Instead, under 
the Deepwater Port Act, the Secretary of Transportation is only re-
quired to consult with the Departmen t of the Army regarding naviga-
tion issues before issuing a license for such uses.73 Under the Ocean 
Thermal Energy Conversion Act, the Administrator of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) must only consult 
with the Coast Guard regarding navigation issues before issuing a li-
cense.74 Clearly, Congress in no way intended the Corps to exercise 
general authority over uses of the OCS, much less any default authority 
over uses that Congress has not even authorized. 
animal and plant life but does not include water power, or the use of water for the production of 
power." [d. § 1301 (e) (emphasis added). 
68 [d. § 1331 (k)-(m), (q). Not surprisingly, wind energy projects on non-OCS public 
lands are not considered the extraction of minerals, but rather are permitted as grants of 
rights-Qf-way under Title V of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. [d. 
§§ 1761-1771 (2000); Instruction Memorandum No. 2003-020 from Kathleen Clarke, Direc-
tor of the Bureau of Land Management, to All Field Officials (Oct. 16, 2002), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fy03/im2003-020.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2003). 
69 See 43 U.S.C. § 1332. 
70 See generally id. §§ 1331-1356. 
71 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524. 
7242 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9168. 
73 33 U.S.C. § 1503(c)(7). 
74 See 42 U.S.C. § 9111(c)(3). 
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In Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, however, the district court held 
that Congress's clear intent in the language of 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1) 
was to extend the Corps's authority to '" all artificial islands, and all in-
stallations'" on the OCS.75 The court further held that the phrase 
"'which may be erected thereon for the purpose of [exploiting mineral 
resources] ,,, is no limitation at all, reading "may be" to mean "including, 
but not limited to. "76 In this interpretation, the court was guided by the 
"predominan t importance "77 of the legislative history of the 1978 
amendments, which states that the 1978 changes were "technical only," 
and that "[i]t is not the intention of the conferees to limit the authority 
of the Corps of Engineers as to structures used for the exploration, de-
velopment, removal, and transportation of resources. "78 On appeal, a 
central issue will be whether the plain language of a statutory amend-
ment can be outweighed by legislative history which is not only inconsis-
tent with the amendment, but is in fact in direct contradiction to the 
plain language and effect ofthe amendment.79 
B. Property Rights 
A second issue in the current litigation is the lack of property 
rights to use and occupy offshore lands for wind energy purposes.so 
The Corps's regulations require section 10 permit applications to be 
signed by the applicant as an "affirmation that the applicant possesses 
or will possess the requisite property interest to undertake the activity 
proposed in the application."81 The provision clearly appears to re-
quire that an applicant have sufficient property rights as a prerequi-
site for a permit. The Corps's regulations further state that a permit 
"does not convey any property rights, ... or any exclusive privileges" 
75 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 288 F. Supp. 
2d 64,75 (D. Mass. 2003) (quoting from 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a». 
76Id (quoting from 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a». 
77 See id. at 73. 
78 See id. at 73-74 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1474, at 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1681). 
79 Controlling law is quite clear that the unambiguous language of the statute controls 
if it is in conflict with an interpretation suggested in legislative history or claimed by the 
Corps. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) ("When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, then, ... 'judicial inquiry is complete.'"); Ciampa v. Sec'y of 
Health & Human Servs., 687 F.2d 518, 525 (Ist Cir. 1982) (stating that legislative history 
should be used ·'to resolve ambiguities and not to create them'" (quoting Mass. Fin. 
Servs., Inc. v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 545 F.2d 754, 757 n.7 (Ist Cir. 1976»). 
80 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 76-78. 
8\ 33 C.F.R. § 325.1 (d)(7) (2003). 
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and "does not authorize any injury to property or invasion of rights or 
any infringemen t of federal, state or local laws or regulations. "82 
Under current law, there are no means by which a private party 
such as Cape Wind may obtain property rights from the United States 
to occupy federal submerged offshore lands for activities such as those 
Cape Wind proposes. The DOl, which bears primary responsibility 
under the OCSLA for administering the regulatory program for the 
exploitation of OCS mineral resources, formally represen ted the state 
of the law in its letter to Vice President Cheney, cited above.83 There-
fore, at the time it issued the permit, the Corps had certain knowl-
edge that Cape Wind did not and would not possess the requisite 
property interest to undertake the activity contemplated by the appli-
cation. Only an act of Congress could grant such an interest. No 
agency of the executive branch may authorize the use of federal lands 
without congressional authorization, as such power is reserved to 
Congress under the Property Clause of the Constitution.84 
Nonetheless, the district court held that the Corps's regulations 
do not require an applicant to have sufficient property rights as a pre-
requisite for a permit.85 The court interpreted the regulations to re-
quire only that an applicant "'affiT1ll[] that the applicant possesses or 
will possess the requisite property interest.'''86 The court further held 
that "even if the Corps had doubted the sufficiency of Cape Wind's 
property interest in the OCS lands in issue, it would not have had the 
authority to consider Plaintiffs' property interest argument in its re-
view of the data tower permit application."87 The court based its con-
clusion on Corps regulations which provide that the Corps should not 
enter into disputes over property interests,88 and disputes over prop-
erty interests should not enter into the Corps's public interest re-
view.89 In simple terms, and even though the Corps's regulations 
82 Id. § 320.4(g) (6). 
83 See H.R. 5156, 107th Congo (2002); Watson Letter, supra note 25, at 1. 
84 See U.S. CONST. art. lV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belong-
ing to the United States ... ."). The Court has clarified the meaning of this clause, stating 
that "the power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations." See 
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976). 
85 Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 77. 
86 See id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(g) (6)). 
87 Id. at 77-78. 
88 33 C.F.R. § 325.1 (d) (7) (2003). 
89 See id. § 320.4(g) (6). 
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specifically require an applican t' s represen tation on property in terest, 
the Corps is thereafter indifferen t on the subject.90 
While there may be sound reasons for a general policy discourag-
ing the Corps from entering into private land disputes, in the case of 
offshore lands, there is no dispute about who owns the OCS lands. IT 
the court's decision is upheld on appeal, the rather absurd conclusion 
will be that there is no federal agency which can even consider the 
fact that there is currently no mechanism by which an applicant such 
as Cape Wind can acquire any property rights to use and occupy the 
offshore lands for wind energy purposes. The foreseeable conse-
quences of this decision are that private parties will proceed-as in-
deed they already have-to occupy federal lands on the OCS for non-
mineral extraction purposes, on the sole basis of a section 10 permit, 
issued in a regulatory vacuum, without any property interest in, or 
authorization to occupy, those lands. This predictable result will 
clearly thwart congressional policy, as expressed in the OCSLA, to ex-
ercise "power of disposition" over the OCS, and provide for its "or-
derly development."91 Under any standard, issuing a permit on this 
basis would seem to be arbitrary and capricious.92 
In the OCSLA, Congress declared a policy that "the outer Conti-
nental Shelf is a vital national resource reserve held by the Federal 
Govern men t for the public, which should be made available for expedi-
tious and orderly development, subject to environmental safeguards, 
in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of competition 
and other national needs. "93 Implicit in this statemen t is the need for 
express authorization of any use of the OCS for any purpose. Simi-
larly, the declared in ten t of Congress in the Ocean Thermal Energy 
90 See id. ("The applicant's signature on the application [for a section 10 permit] is an 
affirmation that the applicant possesses or will possess the requisite property interest to 
undertake the activity proposed in the application."). Despite this provision, the Corps has 
insisted that, based on its own interpretation of its regulations, it was not required to ad-
dress the property issue surrounding the Cape Wind Project. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket 
Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 77. 
91 See 43 U.S.C. § 1332(1), (3) (2000). 
92 See AT&T v. FCC, 836 F.2d 1386, 1388, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Here, the court of ap-
peals held an administrative order to be arbitrary and capricious because its predictable 
result would be to undermine the agency's own policy. Id.; accord Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 
949 F.2d 864, 873 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Roman v. Korson, 918 F. Supp. 1108, 1114 (W.D. 
Mich. 1995) (holding regulatory loophole to be arbitrary and capricious because "its end 
result is as predictable as it is dire"); Boston & Me. R.R. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 830, 
837 (D. Mass. 1962) (finding administrative order lacking ill rational basis in part because 
it would lead to an absurd result if pressed to its logical conclusion). 
93 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (emphasis added). 
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Conversion Act is to "authorize and regulate the construction, location, 
ownership, and operation of ocean thermal energy conversion facili-
ties, "94 and in the Deepwater Port Act, to "auth01ize and regulate the 
location, ownership, construction, and operation of deepwater ports 
in waters beyond the territorial limits of the United States. "95 Clearly, 
Congress considers express authorization to be a necessary prerequi-
site for use of the offshore area.96 
If the Alliance court is correct, then section 10 serves as authority 
for any kind of development in offshore waters not subject to an exist-
ing statute, undermining the entire premise of the extensive body of 
laws governing the federal estate that such use, occupancy, and devel-
opment cannot be allowed without express authorization. If section 10 
can be used for a massive wind energy project, it also can be used for 
any other development, including other activities that have been pro-
posed previously, such as large-scale aquaculture, liquefied natural gas 
terminals, and resorts and floating casinos. Even the legitimate in terest 
in promoting alternative energy is not worth such a wholesale abdica-
tion of the federal interest in OCS lands, with its attendant precedent 
for a host of environmentally harmful activities. As a result, until such 
authority has been established by Congress, there is no reason to invest 
administrative resources in the review of specific permit applications. 
III. A STARK COMPARISON- THE CORPS'S APPROACH VERSUS ALL 
OTHER OFFSHORE RESOURCE REGULATORY PROGRAMS 
A. The Corps's Appmach and Its Limitations 
Reference to all other federal statutes used to authorize compa-
rable uses of federal lands and waters demonstrates the deficiencies in 
the proposition that section 10, NEPA, and commonwealth law bring 
into play all of the relevant decision making considerations necessary 
to review offshore wind projects. 
As an initial matter, it is clear that the RHA was not intended to 
serve this purpose. Rather, the purpose of that law is to regulate ob-
structions to navigation.97 In fact, Congress initially enacted section 10 
9442 u.s.c. § 9101 (a) (1) (emphasis added). 
95 33 V.S.C. § 1501 (a) (1) (emphasis added). 
96 Indeed, any unauthorized use of the DCS would constitute common law trespass. 43 
V.S.C. § 1333(a) (2) (A) (extending as federal law the criminal and civil laws of adjacent 
states to the DCS). 
97 See, e.g., Wilson v. Hudson County Water Co., 76 A. 560, 565 (NJ. Ch. 1910). 
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in 1890,98 after the Supreme Court held that in the absence offederal 
legislation, the federal government was powerless to protect the na-
tion's navigable waters from obstruction, including obstacles created 
by state-authorized projects.99 This section, with minor changes, be-
came section 10 of the 1899 RHA. Two decades later, the Corps failed 
in an attempt to use the RHA to object to a proposed sewer in New 
York City, when the judge ruled that the only purpose of the law was 
regulation of obstacles to navigation. too 
The basis for Cape Wind's argument that the section 10 process 
is adequate arises from a single provision in the Corps's regulations: 
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a). This provision calls for the application of a gen-
eralized and vague "public interest" test. tOt That test simply provides 
that, in making a section 10 decision, enumerated factors relevant to a 
proposal to impede navigation must be considered, including issues 
such as conservation, economics, aesthetics, fish and wildlife, historic 
preservation, and energy needs, among others.102 Based upon this ge-
neric listing of factors to consider, Cape Wind argues that a sound de-
cision will be made regarding uses of the coastal and offshore waters 
for virtually any kind of project, including an unprecedented and 
massive wind energy facility.to3 
Cape Wind's premise may be valid for run-of-the-mill projects 
within the ambit of section 10, where what is at issue is the construc-
tion of a structure that would be located in waters of the United States 
and impede navigation, such as a pier, bulkhead, buoy, jetty, or similar 
facility. Cape Wind's premise is wholly inadequate, however, for major 
Id. 
Section 10 may be searched in vain for the discovery of any affirmative grant 
of right or power for the construction of any instrumentality of commerce. 
The section is entirely negative and prohibitive in character. It is intended to 
prevent obstruction to navigation, and that alone .... To say that it is author-
ity for the prosecution of a work or works in or under any of the navigable wa-
ters of the United States, unless those works have first been affirmatively 
authorized by proper authority, either state or federal, is in my judgment to 
give the section a meaning which is unsupported by any rule of construction 
known to the law. 
98 See Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch.907, § 10, 26 Stat. 426, 454 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000». 
99 SeeWillamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. I, 12 (1888). 
100 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, BRIEF HISTORY: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVrTIES, at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/history/brief3.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). 
101 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2003). 
102 See id. 
103 See Watson Letter, supra note 25, at 1. 
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uses of federal lands and waters for projects that will exploit natural 
resources for private gain. In such a context, more detailed guidance 
and, as Ms. Burton has stated, comprehensive regulatory review and 
oversight is called for.104 
B. Common Elements of Natural Resource Regulatory Pmgrams 
Reference need only be made to the numerous other federal 
programs that provide the basis for the use and occupancy of federal 
lands or the extraction and use of natural resources for an illustration 
of how such programs are typically structured,l05 This includes pro-
grams for the use of offshore lands and waters, as well as onshore uses 
of alternative energy resources. 
In every such instance, Congress has established programs that go 
far beyond the kind of review called for by the single paragraph of the 
Corps's regulation.106 All of the other programs contain common ele-
men ts missing from section 10 review. These include: (1) resource-
specific environmental standards; (2) enumerated criteria upon which 
a decision must be made, not mere factors to be considered; (3) stan-
dards to guide decision making on the balancing of interests in making 
decisions; (4) delegation of power to the appropriate agencies with the 
relevant expertise; (5) land use authorization mechanisms; (6) com-
petitive bidding procedures to attain use of federal resources; (7) fair 
market value requirements to ensure return to the government and the 
taxpayers for the use of public trust resources; (8) specification of areas 
to be off-limits to development; (9) due diligence requirements for the 
development and use of the resource to ensure efficiency and public 
health and safety; (10) enforcement and citizen suit provisions; and 
(11) mandatory roles for state and local governments,1°7 All of these 
elements are missing from section 10,108 The RHA was never intended 
to be the basis upon which land use or energy project decisions would 
be made. Nor does the "public interest" test of 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) pro-
104 See H.R. 5156. 107th Congo (2002); Watson Letter, supra note 25. at 1. 
105 See, e.g.. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000). 
106 See Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (2000); Ocean Thermal Energy 
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9168 (2000); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000). 
107 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9168; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356. 
108 See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (mandating that "[tlhe creation of any obstruction not 
affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the 
United States is prohibited ... except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers 
and authorized by the Secretary of the Army· but failing to offer the specific guidelines 
found in other statutes regarding the development and use of federal lands). 
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vide adequate constraints for informed agency decisionmaking.109 It 
makes no provision, for example, for the disciplined consideration of 
alternative sites, including those deemed not appropriate for develop-
ment. llo It is simply a list of issues to consider relative to the question of 
whether to allow an impediment to navigation.1l1 
C. OCSLA-Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals 
One of the best examples of the proper and accepted approach 
to authorizing the use of federal offshore lands, waters, and resources 
is the OCSLA.l12 This statute is the original charter for uses of off-
shore lands and waters. l13 As originally promulgated, and then further 
developed in its 1978 amendments, the OCSLA sought to encourage 
and facilitate the extraction of oil, gas, and other minerals from the 
OCS)14 Despite the focus on oil and gas, the OCSLA also delineates a 
general framework to govern future policy decisions with respect to 
all uses ofthe OCS.1I5 
In developing the OCSLA, Congress noted how important it is to 
establish specific standards governing uses of these lands and wa-
ters.1I6 Recognizing the unique nature of federal offshore areas, Con-
gress made it clear that business as usual under generic federal 
authorities such as the RHA was not enough.1I7 
To carry out this comprehensive approach to uses of offshore 
lands and waters, Congress articulated guiding principles in sec-
109 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2003). For example, in Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 
the court affirmed the Corps's authority under the OCSLA to regulate non-extractive 
structures, stating that 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) simply requires that it "should consider, among 
other things environmental factors." See 288 F. Supp. 2d 64, 76 (D. Mass. 2003). 
110 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2) (stating that "[wlhere there are unresolved conflicts as 
to resource use, the practicability of using reasonable alternative locations and methods to 
accompli~h the objective of the proposed structure or work" will be considered, but focus-
ing on the issue of navigability and not necessarily other concerns such as aesthetics). 
111 See id. 
112 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332. 
1\3 SeeH.R. REP. No. 413, at 1-2 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2177, 2177-78. 
114 See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 
Stat. 629 (1978) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1801 (7» ("[Tlhe Outer Continental Shelf con-
tains sign ifi can t quan tities of oil and natural gas and is a vital national resource reserve 
which must be carefully managed so as to realize fair value, to preserve and maintain com-
petition, and to reflect the public in terest ... ."). 
115 SeeH.R. REP. No. 413, at 1-2 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2177, 2177-78. 
116 See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 
Stat. 629 (1978) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1332(4» (recognizing the need for "effective 
management" of the OCS and providing specific guidelines to achieve this end). 
117 Seidd. 
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tion 1332, entitled "Congressional Declaration of Policy. "118 This sec-
tion also establishes the form federal control over the OCS is to take.119 
In essence, it comprises a list of the objectives the OCSLA is meant to 
accomplish. While general in nature, collectively they serve as a set of 
values to guide how the United States will allow the OCS to be used,120 
They describe the values that shape the United States' relationship to 
the OCS for all purposes, not just oil and gas.121 Under section 1332, 
the following general principles are of particular relevance. 
1. Environmen tal Safeguards 
Subsection 1332(3) states that the OCS is a "vital national resource 
reserve held by the Federal Government for the public" whose devel-
opmen t should be subject to "environ men tal safeguards, in a manner 
which is consistent with the maintenance of competition and other na-
tional needs. "122 Obviously, the RHA was not considered to be 
sufficient, or such a provision would not have been necessary.123 Sub-
section 1332(3) therefore provides that any use to which the OCS 
might be put must conform to a certain level of environmental safe-
guards. 
2. Fair Market Value 
Subsection 1332(3) also requires that any program providing for 
development of the OCS be in the public interest, and be consistent 
with principles of competition and other national needs.124 At the 
very least, that would require that the United States receive fair mar-
ket value for any private use of its property.125 The importance of such 
a requirement is apparent in the offshore wind energy context, where 
large amoun ts of federal land are now subject to private claims under 
118 See 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). This provision outlines the role of federal, state, and 
local government in the development of the OCS. [d. It also requires that these lands be 
developed "in a safe manner by well-trained personnel using technology, precautions, and 
techniques sufficient to prevent or minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of well con-
trol, fires, spillages, physical obstruction to other users of the waters or subsoil and seabed, 
or other occurrences which may cause damage to the environment or to property, or en-
danger life or health." [d. § 1332(6). 
119 See id. § 1332. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. § 1332(3). 
123 See id. 
124 [d. 
125 See 43 U.S.C. § 1332. 
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section 10}26 Clearly, the United States is foregoing considerable 
revenue by allowing these lands to be used without compensation. 
3. State and Local Government Involvement 
Subsection 1332(4) insists that states receive sufficient assistance in 
dealing with any adverse consequences that may result from a given use 
ofthe OCS.127 Further, subsection 1332(5) requires that "the rights and 
responsibilities of all States and, where appropriate, local governments, 
to preserve and protect their marine, human, and coastal environ-
ments ... should be considered and recognized. "128 These two subsec-
tions insist that any federal policy with respect to the OCS take the in-
terests of state and local governments into account, thereby insuring 
that such policy will not be made in isolation,129 They therefore stand 
for the general proposition that federal OCS policy must be cognizant 
ofthe interests of affected state and local governments.130 
These are the key elements of the OCSLA's blueprint for OCS 
use. They do not articulate every detail; rather, they define the space 
within which the details must fit, and out of this a balanced and com-
prehensive program is derived. l3l However the federal government 
chooses to develop the OCS, the applicable policies and programs 
must be consistent with these principles. 
The general and categorical character of the standards in sec-
tion 1332 is emphasized in the legislative history. In a section headed 
"Purposes of the Legislation," the House Report states: 
Congress has a special constitutional responsibility to make 
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or 
other property belonging to the United States . ... The [OCSLA] is 
essentially a carte blanche delegation of authority to the Sec-
retary of the Interior. The increased importance of OCS re-
sources, the increased consideration of environmental and 
onshore impacts and emphasis on comprehensive land use 
126 See Me1o, supra note 2; see also CAPE WIND, supra note 2 (indicating that Cape 
Wind's project will cover twenty-four square miles of the DCS). 
127 See 43 U.S.C. § 1332(4)(A)-(B). 
128ld. § 1332(5). 
129ld. § 1332(4)-(5). 
no ld. 
m See id. § 1332. 
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planning, require that Congress detail standards and criteria 
for the Secretary to follow in the exercise of his authority.132 
This passage acknowledges that the OCSLA makes the OCS a "prop-
erty" of the United States.133 It goes on to suggest that insofar as the 
OCS is such a property, Congress has a constitutional obligation un-
der the Property Clause of the United States Constitution to make "all 
needful Rules and Regulations" to govern it.1M The passage then sug-
gests that Congress understands itself to be fulfilling that obligation 
by setting out certain general "standards and criteria. "135 To the ex-
ten t that the Cape Wind project is a use of the OCS, the Property 
Clause requires that the standards in section 1332 apply to it,136 Sec-
tion 10 of the antiquated 1899 RHA is no substitute for this compre-
hensive and contemporary approach to managing offshore lands. 
Another passage in the 1977 House Report makes the same point 
even more explicitly: 
In addition, policy statements are included to make it clear 
that in administering not only the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, but also any other act applicable, directly or indi-
rectly, to activities on the [OCS], responsible Federal officials 
mnst insure that activities in the shelf are undertaken in an 
orderly fashion, so as to safeguard the environment ... and 
take into acconnt impacts on affected States and local areas. 137 
The passage states unambiguously that these principles are meant to 
govern any and all activities involving the OCS.138 It leaves no doubt 
that the OCSLA establishes a form of federal stewardship over the 
OCS to be shaped by those principles.139 This has been the intent of 
Congress for the past fifty years.140 
Having stated these general principles applicable to all uses of 
the OCS, Congress went on to create a specific management program. 
for oil and gas.141 That program consisted of detailed requirements 
132 H.R. REP. No. 95-590, at 54 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1461 (em-
phasis added). 
133Id. 
134 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, d. 2. 
135 See H.R. REP. No. 95-590, at 54 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1461. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. at 127. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
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found nowhere in the 1899 RHA that is argued by Cape Wind to 
suffice for offshore wind energy plants.I42 In addition, pursuant to 
these standards, the DOl has developed extensive, highly detailed im-
plemen ting regulations.143 
In the OCSLA itself, Congress dictated the basic framework for 
allowing uses of offshore areas for oil and gas. The central elements 
of this program are: 
• Delegation of responsibility for the program to the Secretary of 
the In terior.144 
• Publication of a five-year schedule of proposed lease sales indicat-
ing the size, timing, and location of leasing activity.145 
• Assurance of receipt of fair market value for lands leased and 
rights conveyed by the federal government.146 
• Provision for appropriations and staff necessary to: (1) obtain re-
source information; (2) analyze and interpret exploratory data; 
(3) conduct environmental studies; and (4) supervise operations 
to ensure due diligence in exploration and development of lease 
areas.I47 
• Annual review ofthe leasing program.148 
• Implementation of procedural regulations for program manage-
men t, including: (1) receipt and consideration of nominations for 
any area to be offered for lease or to be excluded from leasing; (2) 
public notice of and participation in development of leasing pro-
grams; (3) review by state and local governments that may be im-
pacted by proposed leasing; and (4) consideration of the coastal 
zone management program in the affected state.149 
• Nomination and evaluation of sites to determine suitability for 
developmen t.150 
In addition to these statutory requirements, the DOl's OCSLA 
regulations provide additional detail and requiremen ts on how to 
make leasing and permitting decisions, and how to ensure environ-
mental protection. For example, the regulations specifY performance 
142 See id. §§ 1331-1356. 
148 See generally 33. C.F.R. §§ 350-382 (2003). 
144 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
145 [d. 
146 [d. § 1344(a)(4). 
147 [d. § 1344(b). 
148 [d. § 1344(e). 
149 [d. § 1344(f). 
150 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a) (3), 1345, 1346. 
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standards, lease requirements, and reporting requirements, and pro-
vide for disqualification, special approvals, rights-of-way and ease-
ments, suspensions, extensions, and cancellations of leases for oil and 
gas operations.l51 The regulations also detail requiremen ts for explo-
ration, development, and production plans, pollution prevention and 
control, safety systems, and safety training. 152 Other regulations gov-
ern exploration and prospecting, oil spill response and financial re-
sponsibility requirements, and operations for minerals other than oil 
and gas. 153 Procedures for the administration of offshore leasing pro-
grams are especially detailed, including requiremen ts for the partici-
pation of affected states, local governmen ts, and other in terested par-
ties, the special consideration of areas of concern, a competitive 
bidding process, and environmental studies.154 
When this highly specific and detailed authority is compared to 
the simplistic and generalized paragraph from the Corps's regulation 
that Cape Wind relies upon, it becomes abundantly clear how 
deficien t the curren t regulatory program is to allow the use of off-
shore lands and waters for massive wind energy plants like Cape 
Wind'S.155 While it may not be necessary to have a regulatory program 
for wind energy as highly detailed as that for oil and gas, it cannot 
reasonably be argued that such significant activities can be permitted 
merely under a vague public interest principle guided by no standards 
of decision making, no articulated balancing test, and no established 
environmen tal safeguards and criteria.156 
To the extent, therefore, that the OCSLA does not currently ad-
dress a specific poten tial use of the OCS or its resources, the following 
steps must be satisfied as a threshold matter: (1) Congress must author-
ize the use of the OCS for such purpose; (2) Congress must delegate 
responsibility to implement and oversee a program for such purpose; 
and (3) the agency in the executive branch to which the responsibility 
is delegated must implement such a program.157 
151 See generally 30 C.F.R. §§ 250-282 (2003). 
152 See id. 
153 See id. §§ 251-282. 
154 See generally 30 C.F.R. § 256. 
155 Compare 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a), with 30 C.F.R. §§ 250-282. 
156 See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000). 
157 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344-1346 (outlining congressional guidelines regarding the use of 
the OCS for extracting oil and gas); H.R. REP. No. 95-590, at 54, 127 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1461 (detailing the congressional intent that use of the OCS for 
natural resources must be in an orderly fashion and under proper federal oversight). 
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Reference to other laws concerning the use of federal lands and 
resources further highlights the inadequacy of the RHA's section 10 
approach. In the onshore context, one of the principal sources of 
authority allowing the use of public lands for mineral extraction and 
other uses is the Federal Land Management and Policy Act 
(FLPMA).158 Like the OCSLA, this law establishes extensive require-
ments for authorization of use of public lands,159 delegation of 
authority to the federal agencies with appropriate expertise,160 de-
tailed requiremen ts for land use decisionmaking,161 special protection 
for specific areas,162 and requirements for payment to the federal gov-
ernment.163 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) governs wind 
energy uses of the public lands under Title V of the FLPMA, which 
authorizes rights-of-way on federal public lands for "systems for gen-
eration, transmission, and distribution of electric energy. "164 The BLM 
has issued a detailed in terim policy to guide wind energy develop-
ment on the public lands while it undertakes a two-year programmatic 
review of the impacts associated with such a program.165 The BLM's 
Interim Policy and programmatic review are examples of the kind of 
regulatory program elemen ts which should be implemen ted in the 
offshore wind context. 
D. Other Resou rees 
In the context of the marine environment, the same principles 
are found in other laws. The Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion 
Act,1OO for example, establishes the rules that govern the use of U.S. 
owned waters for thermal energy facilities. This law establishes a li-
censing system for the location of those facilities,167 and requires the 
involvement of other agencies with relevant expertise.168 It contains 
158 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785. 
159 [d. §§ 1732(b), 1761 (a). 
160 [d. § 1712(a)-(c). 
161 [d. § 1712. 
162 [d. §§ 1711(a),1712(c)(3). 
163 [d. §§ 1734, 1751, 1764(g). 
164 43 U.S.C. § 1761 (a) (4). 
165 See Instruction Memorandum No. 2003-020 from Kathleen Clarke, Director of the 
Bureau of Land Management, to All Field Officials (Oct. 16, 2002), available at http:/ / 
www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fy03/irn2003-020.htm(lastvisitedFeb.ll. 2004); Notice of 
Intent, 68 Fed. Reg. 59,814 (Oct. 17,2003). 
166 42 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9168. 
167 See id. § 9111. 
168 See id. § 9111 (c). 
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specific decisionmaking criteria169 and environmental safeguards.170 
This law also delineates the specific role for coastal states.171 
The Deepwater Port Act follows the same approach.172 Licenses 
are required to locate such ports.173 Authority to license these ports is 
vested in the Secretary of Transportation.174 Decisionmaking and en-
vironmental review criteria apply.175 The role of coastal states is pro-
vided for.176 
Laws dealing with other uses of marine resources, besides land and 
water, apply similar principles. For example, the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act, governing the use of public trust fishery re-
sources of U.S. marine waters, recognizes the need for a comprehensive 
approach.177 This act sets forth: (l) national standards governing all 
uses of fishing resources;178 (2) a mechanism for authorizing private 
parties to harvest fish through comprehensive plans that often require 
specific permits;179 (3) a defined role for the states;l80 and (4) special 
protection and jurisdiction for specific areas.181 In particular, Nantucket 
Sound is recognized as unique due to its geographic configuration; as a 
result, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act vested Massa-
chusetts with jurisdiction over the en tire Sound.182 
Similar concepts and requirements are recognized in the alterna-
tive energy context. Under the Geothermal Steam Act, Congress 
sought to promote the use of this form of renewable, alternative en-
ergy.l83 Despite the goal of promoting alternative energy, Congress 
still saw the need to establish a comprehensive program that addresses 
the same considerations implicit in the OCSLA.IB4 In the Geothermal 
Steam Act, Congress created a mechanism for authorizing the use and 
169 See id. § 911l. 
170 See id. §§ 9117-9118. 
171 See id. § 9115. 
172 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (2000). 
173 [d. § 1503. 
174 See id. § 1503(b). 
175 See id. §§ 1505-1506, 1509. 
176 See id. § 1508. 
177 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883. 
178 See id. § 1851. 
179 See id. §§ 1852-1853. 
ISO See id. § 1852. 
181 See id. § 1855(b). 
182 See id. § 1856(a) (2) (B). 
183 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1028. 
184 Compare id., with 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332. 
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occupancy of federal lands,l85 payments to the United States,l86 areas 
off-limits to development,I87 and delegation to the appropriate agency 
with substantive expertise. ISS The fact that this program has been suc-
cessfully implemented without needlessly burdening the development 
of this alternative source of energy is proof that this same approach 
can be used for offshore wind energy plants. 
Numerous other examples exist in federal law. I89 It is fair to say 
that it is impossible to find under the panoply of federal environ-
mental and natural resources law any program comparable to what is 
being advocated by Cape Wind-a way to allow a private party to use 
and occupy federal property for private purposes, on a massive scale, 
to develop and produce energy from a public resource at no charge, 
with no express authorization to do so, and on the basis of a permit 
governed only by vague and general standards established by an 
agency lacking relevant expertise. As much as alternative forms of en-
ergy deserve public policy support, the deficiencies under the ap-
proach supported by the proponents of offshore wind power plants 
are far too significant to accept. 
E. The Corps's Process in Comparison 
The Cape Wind Project is a private energy project, proposed for 
offshore waters, which is to be located on federal land, and which 
raises questions about the valuation of, and fair market return for, the 
use of public trust resonrces. I90 It will require a balancing of energy 
benefits against unique environmental impacts on fish, birds, marine 
mammals, and aesthetic values. It will have serious adverse effects on 
III? 30 U.S.C. § 1002. 
186 [d. §§ 1003-1004. 
187 [d. § 1014(c). 
188 [d. § 1002. 
189 See, e.g., National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600, 
1611-1614, 472a, 512b (2000); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 
(SMCRA), Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 
U.S.C.); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1782 (2000). 
190 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334-1344. In statutes such as the OCSLA, Congress has set out de-
tailed guidelines regarding leasing fees and other revenue to be generated from private 
developmen t of the OCS. [d. The section 10 permitting process lacks a similar scheme, and 
will not ensure that the federal government is fairly compensated for Cape Wind's use of 
public lands. Compare 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334-1344, with 33 U.S.C. § 403. 
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historic preservation resources.191 Navigation is an important issue, 
but it is not what the Cape Wind project is primarily about. 
In everyone of these areas of interest, the Corps is not the fed-
eral agency that has the appropriate expertise or the resources to 
make the relevan t decisions. Energy projects should be considered by 
agencies such as the Department of Energy,192 the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission,193 and the Minerals Management Service.194 
Uses of offshore lands and waters should be considered by the 
NOAA195 and the Minerals Management Service. Decisions on valua-
tion and fair market return also fall under the ambit of those agen-
cies.196 Decisions regarding birds and living marine resources should 
be made by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service197 and the National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service.198 Historic resource impacts must be adjudged 
in consultation with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation199 
191 See SAVE OUR SOUND, THE WORST LOCATION, at http://www.saveoursound.org/ 
bestworst.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) (expressing concern that 130 turbines in Nan-
tucket Sound will lessen the historic appeal of this area and lead to a loss of tourism). 
192 See U.S. DEP'T Of' ENERGY, MISSION (stating that the department's overarching goal 
is to "advance the national, economic and energy security of the United States"), at 
http://www.doe.gov/engine/content.do?BT_CODE=AD_M (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). 
193 See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, ABOUT FERC (indicating the mission of the 
department is to "regulat[el and oversee[] energy industries in the economic and envi-
ronmental interest of the American public"), at http://www.ferc.gov/about/about.asp 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2004). 
194 See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ABOUT TIlE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE ("The 
Minerals Management Service (MMS), a bureau in the U.S. Department of the Interior, is 
the Federal agency that manages the nation's natural gas, oil and other minerals resources 
on the outer con tin en tal shelf."), at http://www.mms.gov / aboutmms/ (last visited Jan. 24, 
2004). 
195 See NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., MESSAGE FROM THE UNDERSECRE-
TARy-ANNUAL GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM FY 06, 1 (2003) (indicating that this agency pro-
vides a vision in areas of ecosystems, climate, weather and water, and commerce and trans-
portation), available at http://www.noaa.gov/images/agm.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). 
196 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (2003) (discussing the role these agencies play in evaluating 
the merits of private development of the OCS). 
197 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CONSERVING THE NATURE OF AMERICA 2 (1999) 
(declaring the mission of the service to "conserve, protect, and enhance fish, wildlife, 
plants and their habitats"), http://training.fws.gov/library/Pubs/conserving.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2004). 
198 NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NOAA FISHERIES (stating that the agency is "dedi-
cated to the stewardship of living marine resources through science-based conservation 
and management, and the promotion of healthy ecosystems"), at http://www.nmfs.noaa. 
gov/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). 
199 See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRES., ABOUT ACHP: GENERAL INFORMATION 
(2002) (declaring the organization's mission to "promote the preservation, enhancement, 
and productive use of our Nation's historic resources, and advise the President and Con-
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and in coordination with state historic preservation officers, a proce-
dure that the Corps says does not even apply to its section 10 permits 
in offshore waters.200 
The Corps is neither authorized by mission nor staffed to make 
any of these judgments with the requisite degree of expertise.201 This 
is clear from the Corps's mission statement and description of pur-
pose. The Corps's role is to: (1) plan, design, build, and operate water 
resources and other civil works projects; (2) design and manage the 
construction of military facilities for the Army and Air Force; and (3) 
provide design and construction management support for other de-
fense and federal agencies.202 The Corps is not equipped to deter-
mine how and under what circumstances public resources will be 
available for private exploitation.203 The issue properly within the 
Corps's expertise, impacts to navigation, is not the driving force for 
this project. Indeed, the Corps has expressed the view to the Alliance 
that it is not the agency that should have the lead on wind energy pro-
ject development.204 Congress apparently agrees, as a bill introduced 
last year to create a program for offshore developments of this nature 
would vest this responsibility in the Secretary of the In terior. 205 
In addition to lacking the requisite expertise, the Corps does not 
have the resources to review this sudden proliferation of huge off-
shore wind projects.206 The complexity, controversy, and novel nature 
of these projects would be a challenge for any agency. This is espe-
cially true for the Corps, which has a tremendous existing regulatory 
burden for projects that properly belong under its area of expertise 
gress on national historic preservation policy"), at http://www.achp.gov/aboutachp.html 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2004). 
200 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, ENVIRONMENTAl. IMPACT STATEMENT: SCOPE OF 
WORK, WIND POWER FACILITY PROPOSED BY CAPE WIND AsSOCIATES, LLC 6 (2002) (noting 
that the project needs to "fulfill the requirements of Section 106 of [the] National Histori-
cal Preservation Act including coordination with the State Historic Preservation Officer," 
independent of its section 10 requirements), available at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/ 
proects/ma/ccwf/windscope.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT]. 
201 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, WHO WE ARE, at http://www.usace.army.mil/who. 
html#Mission (last modified Aug. 30, 2002). 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 See Leaning, supra note 13 (indicating that Corps officials have stated that they 
"don't have the authority to conduct such a wide ranging assessment for the outer conti-
nen tal shelf"). 
205 SeeH.R. 5156, 107th Congo (2002). 
206 See Leaning, supra note 13 (indicating that there are currently sixty wind energy 
projects awaiting review). 
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and jurisdiction. 207 As a result, there is a serious risk that these pIt i 
ects, especially the forerunning and perhaps most damaging of all-
the Cape Wind project-will not receive adequate review. 
As discussed previously, a common feature of regulatory pro-
grams designed to address activities in the marine environment or 
making use of federal lands for developmen t activities is the consid-
eration of programmatic impacts and alternatives.208 111ese programs 
begin by looking at the big picture on a regional or even national ba-
sis.209 Such an approach is necessary to ensure that any development 
which may be approved is first subject to long-term planning to rule 
out certain areas from development and to ensure that a coordinated 
plan has first been established. 
Such an approach is particularly important for offshore wind en-
ergy projects. As the "land rush" for section 1 0 permits over the last 
year demonstrates, developers are proceeding at an accelerated pace to 
lock-up sites for wind energy plants.210 The Corps is simply processing 
these requests on an individual permit basis. For example, a site off the 
coast of Virginia in a highly sensitive area is being reviewed by the Nor-
folk District, with no apparent coordination with the New England Dis-
trict.211 In fact, the Norfolk District has indicated that it would not even 
prepare an EIS on that project.212 Another project southeast of Nan-
tucket is apparently being processed separately by the New England 
District.213 The Alliance is not aware of any plan to consider these proj-
ects, or the two dozen or so others proposed between Massachusetts 
and Virginia, in any comprehensive or cumulative way.214 
This is more than a deficiency inherent in section 10 and the re-
sult of the absence of an adequate regulatory program. It is also a 
consequence of a deficiency in the NEPA process for the Cape Wind 
project. Simply put, the Corps is conducting far too narrow a review. 
It is limiting the scope to alternative energy projects in New Eng-
land,215 even though the Atlantic coast stretching to Virginia has been 
subject to numerous proposals and the resultant electricity that would 
207 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, supm note 201. 
208 See discussion supm Part Ill.A and accompanying notes. 
209 Seediscllssion supm Part Ill.A and accompanying notes. 
210 See Leaning, supm note 13. 
211 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS NEW ENGLAND DIS-
TRICT, at http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/(Iast visited Jan. 24, 2004). 
212 See id. 
213 See id. 
214 See id. 
215 See ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 200, at 2-3. 
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be produced can readily be sent throughout the region.216 In addi-
tion, there is no indication that the Corps will consider the cumulative 
effects of these projects, even though numerous species of birds, fish, 
turtles, and marine mammals migrate through this region and could 
be confronted with a gauntlet of massive offshore wirId plants. 
These are problems that would be solved under a comprehensive 
regulatory program. It is doubtful that the minimal procedures under 
section 10 could ever produce the necessary review.217 Certainly, as 
currently conducted, the review of the Cape Wind project fails to pro-
vide the necessary review and analysis. 
F. Proposed Regulat01Y Program 
The preceding discussion demonstrates the many serious 
deficiencies in the procedure curren tly being used to review Cape 
Wind's application. The disputes and controversy engendered by the 
Cape Wind project have actually slowed down the reasoned evaluation 
of offshore wirId projects.218 Therefore, in the interest of promoting 
reasonable development of offshore wind projects and the establish-
ment of an adequate regulatory program, the following principles 
should be reflected in a comprehensive federal program to guide fu-
ture decisions on offshore wirId energy projects. 
1. Specific Congressional Direction and Standards for the Program 
Because of the importance of establishing a comprehensive pro-
gram for encouraging new alternative energy uses in federal offshore 
waters, Congress must exercise its responsibility to specify program 
elements and standards. The agencies with the relevant expertise on 
energy, public lands, and the marine environment must be delegated 
this power. Certain elemen ts of the program, such as reliance on 
competitive bidding and the need for comprehensive planning to 
balance development against other resource values, deserve detailed 
authorization from Congress. The program authorization should not 
be so general that it leaves the substance of such an offshore program 
to the preferences of the policy leadership of departments, which will 
change over time.219 
216 See Leaning, supra note 13. 
217 See discussion supra Part I1I.A-B and accompanying notes. 
218 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 288 
F. Sllpp. 2d 64, 70-73 (D. Mass. 2003). 
219 Se~discllssion sttpra Part I1I.A-B and accompanying notes. 
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2. Moratorium 
No permits should be issued under the RHA or any other law for 
such projects until a new federal program is in place. Cape Wind's 
project, for example, already has received such a permit for its initial 
wind energy data gathering tower and has built it without obtaining 
any property right to do SO.220 This facility is therefore trespassing on 
federal lands held in the public trust, and occupying this land and 
water without making any payment to the United States to reimburse 
taxpayers. As this action demonstrates, developers are not waiting for 
an adequate federal regulatory system to be developed; they are pro-
ceeding merely on the basis of a navigability permit. As a result, no 
further permits should be issued, and a moratorium should be put in 
place. This should be accomplished administratively as well, in ad-
vance of a new law, so there is no implication that the section 10 per-
mit, or its process, creates any rights under the new law.221 
3. Pilot Projects 
Without question, alternative energy needs to be promoted. In 
the marine environment, however, there is little experience to draw 
upon to assess the feasibility or impacts of large-scale wind energy pro-
ject developmen t. Thus, while a comprehensive long-term program is 
implemented, progress also should be made on assessing the feasibil-
ity of offshore wind energy projects and refining the technology 
through the development of one or more pilot projects. Such projects 
could be undertaken by the private sector, subject to federal oversight 
and interim standards, in a properly-sited location that avoids the im-
pacts and strong public opposition of a project like Cape Wind ill 
Nantucket Sound.222 
4. Lead Federal Agency 
The use of coastal and offshore areas for these activities cuts across 
the areas of expertise and traditional jurisdiction of numerous federal 
agencies. Of these agencies, it is clear that the Corps is one of the least 
well-suited for making decisions regarding the use of offshore resources 
for energy purposes. 
220 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 76-78. 
221 See discussion supra Part ILA and accompanying notes. 
222 See discussion supra INTRODUCTION, Part lILA, and accompanying notes. 
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The Corps lacks the expertise or authority to assess the feasibility 
of energy projects, to determine appropriate uses of federal offshore 
lands and waters, and to assess adverse impacts on the marine envi-
ronment.223 Indeed, under the OCSLA, the Corps lacks jurisdiction 
over offshore areas.224 Any new federal program will need to be vested 
in the proper agency or agencies. Decisions regarding authorization 
of plans for site-specific development and related activities should be 
made by the NOAA, and a stronger role should be established for 
states. The establish men t of a leasing program and determination and 
collection of royalties, rent payments, and other charges should be 
the responsibility ofthe Minerals Management Service. This approach 
is comparable to the one used for private activities allowed on federal 
onshore lands, where decisions on permitting are made by the Bu-
reau of Land Managemen t or U.S. Forest Service and fiscal considera-
tions are assigned to the Minerals Management Service.225 
5. National Academy of Sciences Study 
There is no prior experience in the United States with offshore 
wind energy production. There is no experience anywhere in the 
world with a project of the magnitude of the Cape Wind proposal. 
Indeed, the very technology to be employed is not even available at 
this time.226 Due to the novel nature of this kind of development, 
careful study is required. Such development should assess the poten-
tial benefits of offshore wind energy if undertaken correctly, the nega-
tive consequences if such projects are carried out in the wrong way or 
in the wrong location, and the economic and technological feasibility 
of such projects. As a result, before any development is undertaken, 
the National Academy of Sciences should be commissioned to con-
duct a technical review of the energy, environmental, and technologi-
cal issues associated with offshore wind energy to ensure that any de-
velopment that does occur is conducted so as to maximize benefits 
and avoid adverse impacts.227 
223 See u.s. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, mpra note 201; Leaning, supra note 13. 
224 See 33 C.F.R. § 329.l2(a) (2003). 
225 See discussion supra Part lIlA and accompanying notes. 
226 See SAVE OUR SOUND, QUICK FACTS: TECHNICAL (2003) (asserting that the wind tur-
bines proposed for Cape Wind's project are experimental technology, and have not been put 
into actual production use), athttp://www.saveoursound.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). 
227 See discussion supra INTRoDucnoN, Part III.A-B, and accompanying notes. 
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6. Comprehensive Planning Process 
Before site-specific offshore wind energy proposals are con'sidered, 
a comprehensive review with broad input from government agencies, 
industry, states and localities, environ men tal organizations, fishery in-
terests, tribes, and the public should be completed to iden tifY federal 
coastal and offshore areas with significant potential for such develop-
ment, as well as areas like Nantucket Sound that should be foreclosed 
from use as a result of environmental concerns or conflicts with alter-
native resource values. 
Failure to look at the big picture in this manner will result in 
piecemeal, ad hoc decision making, driven by individual profit-seekers, 
such as is occurring now under the RHA. Similar regional and na-
tional review programs have occurred in other contexts, such as off-
shore oil and gas, fisheries management, onshore timber harvest, on-
shore mineral energy development, and other resource utilization 
activities. The same principle should apply to the marine environ-
men t for alternative energy developmen t. The best approach is to 
commission a comprehensive leasing program review conducted 
jointly by the Departments of Commerce and the Interior.228 That re-
view would identifY areas appropriate for development and subject 
them to a competitive bidding process. Once leases are issued, site-
specific development plans should be reviewed and approved by the 
NOAA. Leasing and site-specific plan decisions should be made under 
rigorous environmental standards, with the involvement of all rele-
vant agencies, including state and local governments.229 
7. Property Rights 
Offshore wind projects will require the use and occupancy of 
federal lands and waters. Private parties cannot simply seize federal 
land for their own use and profit motive, as Cape Wind already has 
done. An adequate federal regulatory program should establish a 
mechanism, to be applied in areas deemed suitable for possible de-
velopment through a comprehensive review, for granting such prop-
erty rights. This mechanism should rely upon competitive principles, 
228 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is a division of the De-
partment of Commerce. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SITE MAP, at http://www. 
commerce.gov/sitemap.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). The Minerals Management Service 
is a division of the Department of the Interior. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DOl 
HOME, at http://www.doLgov/ (last visited Fed. 6, 2004). 
229 Seediscussion supra Part III.A-B and accompanying notes. 
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through open competition among bidders, seeking a fair return for 
the government and taxpayers. The grant of such leases should be the 
result of a stringent environmental review program. It is this land use 
authorization decision that should be the focal point of federal envi-
ronmental review and analysis, not the peripheral question of how 
such projects will affect navigability.230 
8. Payments 
The use of areas deemed appropriate for possible development 
should require paymen ts for both use or occupancy of land or water, 
and making use of natural resources for private gain. This could best 
be done through competitive bids, rental for land use, and royalties 
for resource exploitation. Revenues should be shared with state and 
local governments. Incentives, such as reduced and deferred royalty 
payments, can be used to promote appropriately sited wind energy 
projects. At present, no such system exists, and private developers are 
reaping the benefits by proceeding with project development for pri-
vate gain at no cost for the use of federal land or resources.231 
9. Role for States and Local Governments 
Consistent with decisions made in other contexts involving coastal 
and ocean resources, the affected states and local governments must 
have a significant role in the decision process with the federal agencies. 
This principle is found in the OCSLA,232 the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act,233 the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act,234 and 
other federal programs involving coastal and marine areas. This is par-
ticularly importan t because virtually all of these projects also require 
state and local government approval to transmit electricity to market. 
The role of state and local governments should be more than merely 
consultative or cooperative; it must call for sharing of authority and de-
cisionmaking over all aspects of the review and ultimate decision. 
Where necessary, the Coastal Zone Management Act and other laws 
should confirm this enhanced role.235 
230 See discussion supra Part Ill.A-B and accompanying notes. 
231 See discussion supra INTRODUCTION, Part III.A-B, and accompanying notes. 
232 See 43 U.S.C. § 1345 (2000). 
233 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455a-1456a. 
234 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852-1856. 
235 See discussion supra Part III.A-B and accompanying notes. 
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10. Balancing Test 
Proposed uses of offshore areas have both benefits and adverse 
effects. The decisionmaking structure must define a process under 
which the federal, state, and local government review is charged with 
comparing the benefits of wind energy projects with the adverse im-
pacts under carefully designed criteria. This cannot be a vague test, 
such as the one used by the Corps in its so-called public interest deter-
mination under the RHA.236 Instead, it must be a test that applies stan-
dards specifically designed for the marine environment. For example, 
large-scale industrial facilities in coastal and ocean areas will, in addi-
tion to environmental impacts, cause adverse economic impacts, 
through a reduction of property values, tourism, and fisheries,237 com-
bined with recreational and scenic impacts. These impacts must be ac-
corded significant weight in the decisionmaking process and should 
not be sacrificed in the absence of especially strong justification for the 
development activity in the specific location proposed. Moreover, this 
analysis should not be a simple cost-benefit analysis. Consideration also 
must be accorded to factors such as aesthetic, fish and wildlife, and his-
toric preservation values. Such criteria are applied routinely for federal 
programs that involve the use of coastal and ocean resources, and there 
is no reason wind energy, or other new and currently unauthorized off-
shore uses, should evade the same review.238 
Agencies with the requisite expertise must conduct the evalua-
tion. For example, the Corps is not well-suited to balance the pur-
ported benefits of wind energy against the adverse impacts on marine 
life, birds, commercial and sport fishing, aviation safety, marine safety, 
aesthetics, tourism, and real estate values. Agencies qualified to make 
judgments balancing these factors must be in command of the proc-
ess and charged with the mandate to apply expressly defined and suit-
able criteria. Such a test would, for example, readily defeat the mas-
sive Cape Wind project, which will destroy the pristine and highly 
valuable resources of Nantucket Sound for an insignificant increase in 
power through a subsidized program that is not needed by the local 
and regional energy market.239 
236 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2003). 
237 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1332. 
238 See discussion supra Part III.A-B and accompanying notes. 
239 See discussion supra Part III.A-B and accompanying notes. 
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11. Environmental Standards 
Just as criteria for balancing the value of the proposed use against 
its impacts must exist, so too must specific and rigorous environmental 
compliance standards be established. These criteria would amount to 
performance standards. H a proposed activity cannot meet them, proj-
ect approval should be denied. Such standards, if properly developed 
and rigorously applied, would ensure that areas like Nantucket Sound 
will not fall prey to developers seeking the cheapest location to build 
experimental wind plants or other development facilities. 240 
In addition, the Corps argues that the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act does not apply to permits beyond three nautical miles.241 
While this conclusion is in error, it should be made clear that this ap-
plies to the review of offshore wind energy project proposals.242 
12. Public Involvement 
The public must have an adequate role in decision making. This 
should include public comment on all environmental documents, 
hearings held in impacted areas, adequate comment periods, and 
participation in decision making through advisory bodies.243 
13. Citizen Suit Authority 
Citizen suits should be provided for to allow for full enforcemen t 
of the environmental safeguards that would apply to such projects. No 
such system exists under the RHA,244 but one must be provided under a 
comprehensive coastal and offshore regulatory program. Such author-
ity, and rules guiding its use, can be found in other laws concerned with 
the development of coastal and marine resources, such as the 
OCSLA,245 the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act,246 and the 
Deepwater Ports Act.247 There is no basis to exclude such rights here.248 
240 See discussion supra Part Ill.A-B and accompanying notes. 
241 See V.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT AND STATEMENT OF 
FINDINGS, hup:/ /www.nae.usace.army.mil/projects/ma/ccwt/ea.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 
2004). 
242 See discussion supra Part III.B and accompanying notes. 
243 See discussion supra Part m.A and accompanying notes. 
244 See 43 V.S.C. § 403 (2000). 
245 43 V.S.C. § 1349. 
246 42 V.S.C. § 9124(a). 
247 33 V.S.C. § 1515. 
248 See discussion SIlpra Part m.A and accompanying notes. 
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G. Pending Legislation 
Many of the elements necessary for a comprehensive regulatory 
program for offshore wind energy are missing from the legislation 
currently pending in Congress to authorize alternative energy uses of 
the OCS. The proposed bill, which has been incorporated into the 
omnibus energy bill currently pending before Congress, would grant 
the Secretary of the Interior the authority to grant easements or 
rights-of-way on OCS lands for, among other things, activities that 
"produce and support the production, transportation, or transmission 
of energy from sources other than oil and gas. "249 The Secretary of 
the In terior is also directed to promulgate regulations establishing 
appropriate safety, environmental, and natural resource protections, 
including a fair return to the federal govern men t for any easemen t or 
right-of-way. Surety bonds are to be required, and areas are excluded 
if they are units of the National Park Service or the National Wildlife 
Refuge System, or are a National Marine Sanctuary, or any National 
Monument.25o While this legislation would serve to authorize alterna-
tive energy uses of the OCS lands, its requirements are minimal, and 
fall far short of the comprehensive programs Congress has established 
for the use of other public natural resources, most relevantly for the 
use of offshore mineral resources in the OCSLA.25\ In addition, the 
legislation would authorize those uses which are not currently author-
ized under existing law, leaving open the question of curren t jurisdic-
tion.252 Measured by the policy standard established by congressional 
action in similar contexts, the legislation is inadequate.253 
CONCLUSION 
Offshore wind energy developers are attempting to exploit what 
they see as a regulatory loophole that will allow them to use and oc-
cupy federal lands and waters for free, and without adequate review. 
The game plan is to rush as many projects as possible through the 
Corps's section 10 process before a comprehensive program is in 
place. The Corps is a willing, if oblivious, enabler of this plan. Devel-
opers have selected locations that maximize profits rather than mini-
mize environmental harm. The environmental community, correctly 
249 SeeH.R. 5156, 107th Congo (2002). 
250 See id. 
251 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356. 
252 SeeH.R. 5156, 107th Congo (2002). 
253 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1332. 
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insistent on a comprehensive program for other offshore uses, includ-
ing oil and gas, is split on wind projects, with some willing to accept 
the immediate development of alternative energy, even in marine ar-
eas of high environmental value, as more important than a compre-
hensive and lasting process. The result is an extreme anomaly in fed-
eral natural resource law. A comprehensive program must be 
developed that makes possible the orderly, expeditious, and environ-
mentally sound consideration of offshore wind energy projects with 
full return to the federal government. Until such a program is in 
place, no permits should be issued for projects like Cape Wind's pro-
posal. Ultimately, the long term conservation and management of the 
marine environment and the expeditious development of alternative 
energy will benefit from such a program. 

